Russian military and civil officials were fundamentally sceptical about the population of Central Asia. Therefore, rather than advancing a policy of Russification unreasonably, they attempted to maintain a passive stability." 3 
3
While the Russian Empire may have intended to Russify local populations in Central Asia, it failed to make substantive progress towards such a goal. This is evidenced by the fact that throughout the time of the Russian Empire, the subject population of Central Asia had the legal status of inorodtsy [aliens] . Indeed, a significant gulf lay between Russian settlers and locals in terms of religion, culture, and language. 4 Against this backdrop of partial integration, one must consider the people who operated between the Russian Empire and local communities. The role of the "collaborator" under imperial rule has already been a subject of attention in historical research on Western imperial expansion in Asia and Africa. 4 Recent development in the history of the Russian Empire has shed some light on those who played similarly collaborative roles under the Russian rule. As for the specific people who mediated between the Russian Empire and Central Asia, it is well known that the Tatars of the Volga-Ural region played such a role. 5 Studies have also identified collaborators among the local populations of Central Asia.
5
These local collaborators can be broadly divided into two groups. The first were the modern educated class, the so-called "intellectuals." The second were the traditional local elites. Of the two, the former have been researched the most, though there has been a sudden increase in interest in the traditional local elites. It is an unmistakable fact that Russian imperial rule would not have been possible, had it not been for the collaboration of such elites. Research from this standpoint is making forward strides. Research on the settled areas of Central Asia is making the most progress, 6 but there are also interesting findings concerning the situation among nomads, particularly the Kazakhs. 7 Still, research that attempts to construe a more positive analysis of local traditional elites, such as the nomads of Central Asia under the Russian imperial rule, remains as inadequate as ever. 6 In view of this inadequacy, this paper will focus on the chieftains of the Kyrgyz nomads, who inhabited the highland areas of the Tian Shan Mountains. During the late 19th and early 20 th centuries, the intellectuals among the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks had gradually asserted themselves as the leaders of their society. By comparison, the appearance of the Kyrgyz intellectuals came extremely late. Until the early 20 th century, chieftains of the tribes-known as manaps 8 -continued to have a strong presence as the substantial leaders of Kyrgyz society. amongst the Kyrgyz; this had the effect, consciously or unconsciously, of creating or strengthening an aristocratic layer in Kyrgyz society. 12 
9
However, the position of manaps as local collaborators was to change completely after the establishment of the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan in 1867. The change came about because of the establishment of Russian direct rule in the same year, after which manaps were no longer officially recognised as collaborators. Nevertheless, there is an overwhelming body of evidence, including testimonies from contemporaries asserting that manaps continued to hold important positions throughout the imperial period, despite the imposition of Russian direct rule. While ethnologist M.F. Gavrilov, who studied Kyrgyz nomads during the 1920s, acknowledged that the shift to direct rule in 1867 had an impact on them, he argued that throughout the imperial period, "the office of manap (manapstovo) remained rigidly intact, and took on a somewhat monolithic form." 13 10 Why was it that, even into the 20 th century, this traditional chieftain class, though not officially recognised under Russian rule, did not dissolve and in fact continued to hold a powerful influence? As we have seen, one reason for this may be found by examining their activities, including the compilation and publication of genealogies and heroic epics, as well as Islamic acts. Another reason might be the quality of Russian rule itself at the time. The fact that manaps continued to exist under Russian rule, albeit without official recognition, was most likely due to the weak governing ability of the Russian Empire, including the general dissonance within the Russian ruling establishment and interagency disagreements over the treatment of manaps. 11 From such a point of view, this article will look at the way Russian military authorities dealt with manaps during the half century of its direct rule following the establishment of the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan in 1867. Past studies start and end by simply summarizing the system of rule. 14 Therefore, this article will focus on the area of Tokmak uezd (renamed Pishpek uezd in 1888), and Przheval´sk uezd in the southern part of Semirech´e oblast, and discuss how Russian military authorities positioned manaps during the following three periods: 1) from 1867 to the early 1880s, when political reforms were facilitated along with the military expansion into Central Asia; 2) from 1880s to 1905, when Russian direct rule was developed; 3) from 1905 to 1916, when Semirech´e oblast was positioned as the target of the Russian peasant colonization under the initiative of the central government. The principal materials used for this article include the official documents of the Russian military authorities currently stored in the national archives of Kazakhstan (TsGA RK), Uzbekistan (TsGA RUz), Kyrgyzstan (TsGA KR), and Russia (RGIA, RGVIA). To supplement these sources, I also refer to official gazettes, newspapers, and magazines published during the periods in question.
Manap s between political reform and military expansion 12 Following the establishment of the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan, Central Asia was put under a system of Russian direct rule. It is well known that the decision to take this measure had been affected by the spirit of the so-called "Great Reforms" advanced from above in the central part of the empire. 15 In fact, the Governor-Generalship was composed of the same administrative units used for the governance of peasants, namely "oblasts", Why Was Russian Direct Rule over Kyrgyz Nomads Dependent on Tribal Chieftains...
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/4 | 2015 "uezds", and "volosts". In this process, governance of the native population, who were to be organized into volosts, would be restructured in line with the principle behind the Great Reforms: the equalization of existing social groups. In other words, in place of local existing tribal chieftains such as manaps, volost administrators (volostnoi upravitel´) elected by the "common people (narod)" would act as the new official intermediaries for Russian direct rule. 16 Volost administrators were placed under the command of uezd commanders (uezdnyi nachal´nik), who were all ethnically Russian. In other words, volost administrators were local government officials responsible for colonial rule at a grassroots level, whose main responsibility was to implement directives from the Russian military authorities.
Map 1 -The Semirech'e oblast in its regional context (19th century) © Tetsu Akiyama 13 However, the situation in Semirech´e oblast at the time, particularly in the area around the Tian Shan mountain range inhabited by Kyrgyz nomads, was not so straightforward as to allow the unitary implementation of the Great Reforms as in the central part of the empire. Not only had the region itself only just been conquered, it also was adjacent to the Khanate of Kokand (1709-1876), one of the Islamic states in Central Asia based in Ferghana valley. It was therefore a highly significant region in terms of being a site for further military expansion of the Russian Empire.
14 For this reason, it was essential for Russian military authorities to maintain the status quo in the region and establish a defence network in order to tackle the threat of attack from outside. 17 Thus, rather than actively interfering in the lives of Kyrgyz nomads and removing manaps, Russian military authorities, in particular the first Tokmak uezd commander G. Zagriazhskii, continued their attempts to use manaps as intermediaries. Indeed, the fact that manaps were elected as volost administrators in all 14 of the Kyrgyz volosts established in the Tokmak uezd from 1867 to 1868, appears to be due in no small part to the will of the uezd commander. and Syr-Darya", which was instituted in 1867, it was strictly prohibited for officials to intervene in the arbitration. 25 When it came to light that Shabdan, who acted as the uezd commander's proxy at the congress, had forcefully intervened in the arbitration, Kolpakovskii claimed that "if such practice is left to take its course without any censure, it will take root more deeply and inflict grave damage on the mission of the Russian authority". He then accused Shabdan of being "a dangerous individual upon whom the uezd commander [i.e. Zagriazhskii] is placing too much confidence." 26 He repeatedly urged the first governor-general of Turkestan, K.P. Von Kaufman, to impose a punishment. 23 Clear evidence of the reliance on manaps as mediators can also be seen at the coronation of the new tsar Alexander III in Moscow in 1883, as it was the manaps who were selected from the Tokmak uezd as candidates to attend the coronation: Shabdan from the Sarïbagïsh tribe, Baytik from the Solto tribe, and Chnï from the Sayak tribe. 28 Of these candidates, Shabdan was sent to the coronation. Prior to his departure to Moscow, a ticket (bilet) of admission to the coronation was sent to Shabdan from the Asiatic department of the Russian Army General Staff. On the other side of the ticket, the words " Kirgiz Manap" were written clearly ( Figure 1 ). request according to the 1867 decree. 31 Although it still remains unknown why Shabdan was granted a military title in spite of the decree, it is assumed that it was realized at the express wish of Russian officers who had participated in the conquest of Central Asia. 32 In any case, the traditional pattern of awarding a military title to a traditional chieftain was repeated in contradiction to the spirit of direct rule, which aimed to put common people in charge of the government and raise civil engagement.
Manap s as the aristocrats of Kyrgyz 25 Under Russian direct rule, not only did Russian military authorities assign manaps as mediators, they also began to recognize them as "aristocrats" unique to Kyrgyz. To examine this point, it is necessary to go further back in history. Russian military officials responsible for governing the periphery of the empire based their attitude toward Kyrgyz on existing attitudes on the social structure of Kazakh nomads. These officials were well aware that Kazakhs were controlled by the "white bone (aqsüyek)" element, including khans, descendent through the male line of Genghis Khan and sultans of the same family.
As the Russian Empire accelerated its advance into the Kazakh steppe from the mid-18 th century onwards, Russian military officials grew increasingly aware of Kyrgyz as an ethnic group that resided in the periphery of the Kazakh steppe. Accordingly, the absence of the "white bone" or that aristocratic element among the Kyrgyz came to be a defining characteristic of their social structure. Indeed, a Russian geographer P.P. Semënov, who had been creating a survey in the Tian Shan mountain range in the mid-1850s, said that, " manaps are not considered to be an aristocrat akin to the "white bone", that is to say, to sultans of Kazakhs." 33 Such a perception was largely shared among Russian military officials until the early 1870s. 34 26 However, with the establishment of direct rule from 1867, manaps began to be seen as an aristocratic element unique to Kyrgyz. One individual that vividly illustrated this change in attitude was Zagriazhskii. Aside from his actual political duties as uezd commander, he was also a typical "military orientalist (voennyi vostokoved)" involved in collecting ethnographies. 35 In his work on the customary law of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, he states the following:
Generally speaking, Kirgiz [i.e. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz] can be divided into the people of the black bone (chërnaia kost´) and the people of the white bone (belaia kost´).
[…] Sultans and manaps consider themselves to be of the white bone. Sultans consider themselves the descendants of khans of Kirgiz [i.e. Kazakhs], who in turn are the descendants of Genghis Khan, and manaps consider themselves the descendants of Tagay. 36 27 Noteworthy here is how "Tagay", the legendary ancestor of the Kyrgyz tribes, is directly linked to manaps. References to Tagay already appear in accounts of the early 1850s, but in none of these was there even one case where he was directly linked to manaps. 37 From the 1870s onwards, paralleling the quote above, manaps came to be known as "Tagay's descendants" and recognized as a group that was based on a hereditary principle. As such, they came to be positioned as their own "white bone" (i.e. aristocrat) of Kyrgyz, on par with sultans of Kazakhs. Although the extent to which this new attitude mirrored Kyrgyz's own is unclear, based on various remarks this new awareness took root among Russian military officials and scholars from the early 1870s. 38 As expected, Shabdan's "service record (posluzhnoi spisok)" that was made when he was granted the military Manap s as the target of "struggle (bor´ba)" 29 The attitudes of Russian military authorities toward manaps began obviously to change from the beginning of the 1880s. Having accomplished military expansion across Central Asia, Russian military authorities intended to penetrate inside the region of the Kyrgyz nomads. Throughout this process, while Russian military authorities began to indicate a more positive stance toward the protection of the "common people (narod)," manaps came to be seen as an impediment to the colonial rule.
30 In order to understand this attitude, we will begin by considering the special assembly of the people's court that was held in Pishpek in 1884. To that assembly, not only people's judges (narodnyi sud´ia, bi) but also manaps were invited, to determine the "customs" that the people's court would rely on for its judgment. In the session, a provision mandating that "the debts of the poor should be paid by communities and relatives on their behalf" was proposed. 40 However, Pushchin, the Tokmak uezd commander at the time, did not accept the proposal. There remain many uncertainties as to the details of this measure, but it may have been the case that Pushchin was trying to prevent a situation in which manaps used the provision to offload their debts onto the shoulders of the common people.
The situation around the anti-manap struggle 33 Pishpek uezd commander A. Talyzin serves as an excellent entry point to this topic. In a report sent to the Military Governor Ivanov in November 1896, Talyzin writes about his own struggle against manaps as follows:
[...] Slowly but surely, the idea that it is possible to appeal against the tyranny of manaps is taking root amongst the common people.
[…] Ever since I took up this post, I have systematically engaged in the struggle against manaps. I manage to explain to the common people that linages of manaps are no different from that of other Kirgiz [i.e. Kyrgyz]. I have also prepared cases concerning the petitions against manaps, but since their grip over the people remains as strong as ever, many of the petitions end in defeat. 43 34 Attached to this report was a reference document titled "List of names of the native executives and manaps of Pishpek uezd who were indicted for corruption between 1894 and 1896, for collecting taxes from the common people." 44 The document outlined the course of the investigation and the results of 132 cases, many of which had been aborted midway, and out of which not one manap had ever been found guilty. 35 This way of educating the common people and creating suits against manaps was not a successful project in the anti-manap struggle, mainly because petitions were difficult to substantiate. As Talyzin points out, the common people were not willing to disclose any information to him:
[…] Throughout my five years of service, I have attempted to gather evidence to substantiate the rumour amongst the common people that manaps collect taxes from them. However, I could not find a single person who was prepared to give witness. The only response I have ever gotten is "We have nothing to petition for. Everything is fine." 45 36 Given this situation, while Talyzin was calling for the struggle against manaps, he did not always break off a relationship with manaps including Shabdan. In reality, it is impossible to ignore the role played by manaps as arbitrators. Even Talyzin admitted that Shabdan proved very useful in arbitrating cases of "factional infighting (partiinaia bor´ba)" that was used to occur in election of volost administrator. 46 In fact, in 1892 Talyzin sent Shabdan to intervene in a case of factional infighting that had broken out in mountainous region in the south of Pishpek uezd. 47 In addition to this, among the manaps of comparatively younger generation, there were those who were taken into the Russian military government. Indeed, under Talyzin two young manaps served: Mukhamed-Ali-Mulatalin and Diur Sooronbaev. The former worked as a translator (pis´mennyi perevodchik) and in 1895 he was appointed as a collegiate (kollezhskie registratory). 48 As for the latter, though unofficially, Diur Sooronbay served as an important collaborator, especially for a school building program. Russian-native schools (Russko-kirgizskie shkoly), the first of which was built in Tashkent in the mid-1880s, came to the Kazakh steppe and Semirech´e at the end of the 19 th century. 49 In 1896, there was a plan to build a Russian-native school in Pishpek uezd, where Kyrgyz nomads lived. The construction of the school required large sums of money, but the funds were raised by appointing powerful manaps including Diur to act as assistants. 50 An article in the "Newspaper of the Steppe Region (Dala Walayatïnïng Gazetí)" printed in September 1897 and titled "News from Pishpek", described manaps as "an undesirable phenomenon" and denounced them as men who stood in the way of the school building project. 51 The reality, however, was that the school project was driven Exile of manap s exposes the weakness of Russian rule 37 The anti-manap struggle did not take the same form throughout the region. Indeed, in the mountainous region (zagornaia storona) running from the Kyrgyz Ala-too mountains to the frontier region of Qing China, for example, things were different. Although this region had already been incorporated into Russian rule by the time the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan was established in 1867, the Russian population here remained extremely small, even at the end of the nineteenth century. This is because the region was an "isolated corner of land" effectively beyond the reach of Russian surveillance. In an attempt to gain control there, the Russian Empire enhanced its surveillance over the region in 1895 by setting up the At-Bash district (uchastok).
52

Map 2 -Administrative geography of Kyrgyz territory under Russian rule
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38 A leading figure who advanced the anti-manap struggle in this region was the Commander of the At-Bash district. As can be seen in the following quotation, he was deeply suspicious not only of manaps, but also of the native colonial organization itself:
Manaps have become accustomed to the local legal system, which provides Kirgiz [i.e. Kyrgyz and Kazakhs] autonomy and a people's court, and they have formed a tight organization (strogaia organizatsiia). This organization is an obstacle that stands between the common people and Russia. By manipulating the people's court and the local administrative institutions to serve their own interests, manaps are continuing to hold the common people in, what is in reality, the very same condition of slavery that they were in before [Russia's] conquest. In order to defuse such a situation, the commander managed to deploy Russian volost clerks (volostnoi pisar´) to each volost, and instructed them to keep a close watch on the activities of the local population. 54 Belek Soltonoev noted that such a strategy reaped some measure of success: "Ever since volost clerks began spying on the natives, the exploitation of the poor has decreased from the level it once was." 55 However, this strategy was not without problems. Owing to poor pay, many of the volost clerks extorted bribes from the local population. In fact, between 1899 and 1900, two Russian volost clerks in the At-Bash district-the clerk of the Choro volost and the clerk of the Sayak volost-were relieved from their posts for this very reason. 56 Furthermore, as the Commander of the At-Bash district himself noted, some of the volost clerks did not only perform their duties, but also were in fact serving manaps. 57 40 Alongside the strengthening of a system of surveillance, the Commander of the At-Bash district sometimes exercised tougher measures, including the exile (vyselenie) of manaps.
The Commander thought that in order to completely dismantle the "obstacle" that manaps created by exploiting the local administrative system, it would be necessary to physically remove them. Contrary to such a tough attitude, the central Tsarist government was lukewarm towards the idea of exile. When it was requested, 58 the Ministry of Internal Affairs refused to give consent, stating that, "the matter can be settled within the framework of local government authority and general law and order." 59 In response, the governor-general of Turkestan complained about "the lack of forces, staff, and money necessary for carrying this out," 60 and he succeeded in persuading the ministry to consent to the exile of two manaps who wielded considerable influence in the mountainous region. One of these manaps was Choko Kaidu ( Isengul volost) of the Sarïbagïsh tribe. Choko was exiled twice. The first time was to the Nizhnii-Ili volost, Vernyi uezd in 1896, and the second to Osh uezd, Ferghana oblast in 1902. The second manap was Kasïmbek Bakotay (Choro volost) of the Sayak tribe, who was exiled to the Ferghana oblast in 1902.
41 However, the exile policy was not as effective as hoped. In fact, after being exiled to Vernyi uezd for extortion and collecting illegal tax, Choko Kaidu, working through the Isengul volost administrator and others, collected 700 rubles' worth of taxes from the local population. 61 Furthermore, when he returned to his home in the Isengul volost after completing his sentence, he wasted no time in rebuilding the "obstacle," by making his son the volost administrator and filling the official positions of the volost with members of his own faction. This allowed Choko to once again collect taxes from the common people. 62 Thus, while the exile of the manaps appeared to be a radical policy, it was actually a measure taken due to the "weakness" of Russian military authority.
Manap s under the development of the resettlement policy 42 The early years of the 20 th century marked a major turning point in Russian rule in Central Asia. One of the key policies during this period was the resettlement policy ( zemleustroistvo). In fact, the Stolypin government introduced the program in order to send surplus population in the central part of the empire to the peripheries, as immigrants. 63 Under this policy, Central Asia and in particular the Semirech´e oblast was to be a major destination for Russian peasant migrants. To advance this policy, it was essential to The Resettlement administration as a new supporter of the antimanap struggle 43 In 1905, in order to execute the resettlement policy in Semirech´e oblast, the branch office of the Resettlement administration (Pereselencheskoe upravlenie) was set up and placed under the jurisdiction of the Main Administration of Land Management and Agriculture (Glavnoe upravlenie zemleustroistva i zemledeliia). The main priority of the body was securing land for Russian settlers by appropriating it from the nomads. However, it also sought to use the program as a lever for advancing social reform among the nomads of the area. The first head of the Resettlement administration in Semirech´e, O. Shkapskii, saw the society of Kyrgyz nomads as one in the process of a class struggle between feudal lords (manaps) and the common people. 64 This idea not only paralleled the relationship between Russian landlords and peasants, but also took the prevailing idea about manaps and the common people and adapted it into the context of the Narodonik movement. 65 Within this context, officials of the Resettlement administration believed that it would be possible to emancipate the common people from the "yoke of manaps" by organizing them into settlement villages independent from manaps. The belief was that Russian migrants would be able to settle in the surplus of agricultural areas secured as a result of the resettlement of the Kyrgyz common people. 66 By encouraging a transition from nomadic to sedentary life, the Resettlement Administration was waging an anti-manap struggle. Administration officials approached Kyrgyz nomads to encourage them to also make this transition, which they did in part by using the factional infighting over volost elections: the Resettlement Administration would approach faction leaders who had lost volost elections and suggest they petition the Russian military authorities for settlement ( perekhod v osedlost´) by dividing up the existing volost. Faction leaders believed that they could not only take power as an administrator of the newly established sedentary volost, but also secure land as soon as possible in advance of land expropriation. 44 As for manaps who held sway in the volosts, they responded to the tactic by using the people's courts, which were under their influence, to put pressure on those Kyrgyz who were pro-settlement. An author called Sh.V. described this situation in an article entitled "On the Kyrgyz," which appeared in 1911 in the Tatar journal Shūrā: brought a number of complaints to the people's court against these Kyrgyz with the aim of forcing them to abandon their plans to become sedentary. 68 Russian military authorities still relying on manap s 46 However, the response to this situation from Russian military authorities, including the oblast government of Semirech´e was generally half-hearted. In 1907, the individuals concerned held a meeting in Vernyi regarding the resettlement issues. In the meeting, the Resettlement administration characterised the settlement movement as an attempt to seek "emancipation from manaps," and emphasised the historical significance of such a goal. In contrast, the oblast government described it as a movement seeking the "emancipation from their burdens" in the context of factional infighting over volost elections. 69 In fact, despite the order from the Turkestan governor-general to protect the pro-settlement Kyrgyz from oppression via the people's courts, the oblast government did not take any specific countermeasures and instead delegated the entire matter to the lower local military authorities. 47 However, not only were local military authorities indifferent to the settlement movement, they actually aided and abetted manaps. For example, Shkapskii gives the following statement regarding the response of the uezd commander to his task of protection:
The 48 Such an attitude was even more pronounced in the police force of the district (Uchastkovyi pristav), an institution set up under the uezd's jurisdiction in 1902. 71 While it was responsible for surveilling the local population, the police preferred to maintain order by forging a cooperative relationship with manaps rather than engaging in the struggle against them. Given such a cooperative relationship, the police officers were more intent on suppressing the settlement movement than protecting it. A settlement movement leader in the Sukuluk volost wrote of the police officer in the Belovodskii district, G. Fovitskii, that he was "a complete enemy of settlement":
Fovitskii is under the thumb of the manaps who oppose settlement.
[…] He is in debt to Cholpankul and other manaps in the district. He […] has time and time again demanded that requests for settlement be withdrawn. 72 49 Moreover, when it was decided at the assembly of the Sukuluk volost in 1908 to exile the leading advocates of settlement, the plan was supported not only by the police officer of the district, but also by the uezd commander. 73 50 There was even an example of the reliance on manaps in the Tomak district, evidenced by the words of D. Uraevskii, who had worked at the district:
[…] Kutukov, the police officer of the Tokmak district and his predecessor stuck to a policy of maintaining a good relation with the members of Shabdan's family. The reason for this is that the Shabdan family considerably eased the burden of controlling the district.
[…] It was not possible for the police officer to solve various problems that occurred in the district without the support of manaps." policy to divide the volost, the district police officer tried to prevent them from doing so. According to a petition lodged by Kyrgyz seeking settlement in the volost, the police officer visited and pressured them to abandon their plan with the following argument:
There is no benefit from becoming farmers (krest´iane 52 Looking particularly at the At-Bash district (where the anti-manap struggle had raged) offers further insight into the relationship between the administration and manaps. In 1911, the pro-settlement Kyrgyz in the Sayak volost complained to an official of the Resettlement administration, Mazurenko, about the "oppression from manaps" including the levying of taxes. 76 The commander of the At-Bash district, who had been entrusted by the oblast government to deal with the matter, had the following to say:
The collection of taxes from the common people by manaps is a time honoured custom, and inasmuch as manaps do not work in official posts, they are beyond the purview of the Russian courts. The struggle against this custom, which wreaks havoc in the lives of the common people, must be waged through administrative channels, that is to say, through the people's courts. 77 53 Based on this belief, he strongly urged against the involvement of Resettlement administration officials in public administration and revealed that "with the solicitation of Mazurenko, his secretary wrote the petition." 78 In other words, the commander of the At-Bash district was more concerned about the presence of the officials of the Resettlement administration than he was about the anti-manap struggle. Thus, during the campaign to promote the resettlement policy, instead of cooperating to advance the struggle against the manaps, local military authorities not only turned a blind eye to their activities, but also actually utilised manaps to maintain order. 54 The importance of manaps as mediators would come to be recognised not only among Russian military authorities at the local level, but also among the upper echelons. Evidence for this exists in a matter that concerned the allocation of land to the manap Shabdan. In 1903, Shabdan had demanded that the governor-general of Turkestan allocate him 400 desiatina worth of land as befitting a Lieutenant Colonel. While the oblast government of Semirech´e agreed with the request, the Resettlement administration strongly opposed. As a report by a Resettlement administration official describes:
Manaps, and in particular, Shabdan of the Sarïbaghïsh tribe, and Cholpankul of the Solto tribe, both of whom hold the fate of Kyrgyz in their hands, are completely opposed to the settlement campaign, and they are using every available means to fight against it. 79 For this reason, the matter was shelved for a few years. 55 It resurfaced, however, and began to rapidly develop as the resettlement policy became a more pressing issue. With the tough initiatives launched by the Stolypin government in 1909, the restrictions on Russian settlement into Semirech´e oblast were formally lifted. 80 At the same time the regulations governing the appropriation of land, including the provisions concerning nomads' transition to sedentary life (Instruktsii o poriadke opredeleniia gosudarstvennogo zemel´nogo fonda v oblastiakh Akmolinskoi, Semipalatinskoi, Turgaiskoi i Ural´skoi dlia pereseleniia, a ravnykh gosudarstvennykh nadovnostei), were approved by the Council of Ministers (Sovet Ministrov). 81 In this situation, the governorgeneral of Turkestan, A.V. Samsonov, believing that Shabdan would have to be placated in order to achieve a full-scale land appropriation, argued strongly in favour of allocating land to him. However, Samsonov failed to reach an agreement with the Resettlement administration, which continued to voice its opposition to the allocation proposal, 82 and the matter was ultimately entrusted to the Council of Ministers. 83 This prompted Samsonov to make a tour of Semirech´e oblast and arrange an audience with Shabdan. Following the meeting, Samsonov began corresponding with A. Krivoshein, the director of the Main Administration of Land Management and Agriculture:
The Kirgiz [i.e. Kyrgyz] are gullible, and tend to be shallow, carefree, and naturally childlike. Because they lead primitive lives, when they are faced with the conditions of a cultured way of life, which is yet unknown to them, and the new demands arise from it, they cannot avoid turning to "manaps" in particular for support and protection. Manaps are an ancient institution from the past patriarchal way of life, but among the unenlightened Kirgiz masses who inhabit the Steppe, manaps reign supreme, and continue to wield a great deal of power. 56 Thus, while Samsonov considered manaps to be an "ancient institution," he strongly emphasised their role as mediators. He went on to say that, "Shabdan definitely understands that the shift to a sedentary life is unavoidable in the future and that it can bring benefits. He is explaining this to the common people." 85 Samsonov also emphasized the importance of Shabdan's role, saying: "Under conditions where there is no police force whatsoever, Shabdan is an extremely desirable opponent in the struggle against the agitation activities of Kazan-Tatar." 86 In other words, it can be said that setting aside the anti-manap struggle, he repositioned Shabdan in the context of the struggle against the so -called "Pan-Islamic" movement. Thus, Samsonov argued that in order to smoothly advance the resettlement policy, it was absolutely essential that Shabdan-as the key representative of manaps-be allocated the land he desired. Reflecting on Samsonov's "persistent and firm demands", the Council of Ministers, in October 1910, gave their approval to a special allocation of land whereby Shabdan would be given the right to use 400 desiatina for life. 87 Having thus carried through the resettlement policy, Russian military authorities could by no means ignore the influence of manaps, and Shabdan in particular. 57 It was outlined in this chapter that, rather than using the resettlement policy as a lever to intervene in the society of Kyrgyz nomads and undermine the power of the manaps, Russian military authorities continued to rely on them as mediators. In other words, as the resettlement policy became a pressing issue, the "close" relationship between Russian military authorities and manaps become distinct. Meanwhile, there remained a large gulf between Russian military authorities and the common people (narod). As pointed out in the article "On the Kyrgyz," even if the common people petitioned the Russian authorities, their statements would not be believed. 88 In fact, leading advocate of settlement in the Sarïbagïsh volost Alike Alimbek made the following complaint in a letter addressed to the governor-general of Turkestan: Conclusion 58 During the fifty years of Russian direct rule, manaps remained a major influence. As noted in "On the Kyrgyz", "the leaders of Kyrgyz are called manap.
[…] The office of manap ( manaptik) is passed down from generation to generation". 90 This article has examined the conditions that enabled manaps to thrive under Russian direct rule by investigating the quality of Russian governance. 59 From the beginning, Russian military authorities consistently intended to view manaps as an impediment to colonial rule. However, they found themselves unable to undermine the power of manaps and so, conversely, manaps proved useful in supplementing the weakness of Russian military authority. As we have seen in the main discourse of this article, this weakness derived from the multilayered structure of the Russian Empire. In this regard, manaps revealed the discord between the centre and periphery of the empire. In addition to the centre-periphery relationship, there were also various disagreements throughout the periphery. From such discord stemmed the need for manaps to remain as unofficial collaborators until the beginning of the 20th century, and thus they continued to serve as the principle ruling class of Kyrgyz nomads until that time. 60 However, this does not mean that Russian military authorities were pro-actively recruiting, protecting, or nurturing manaps as collaborators. Rather, they were in large part "passively dependent" on manaps in that they were more or less obliged to accommodate them. There were those among the manaps who served in the Russian military authority, and thus we can see the germination of the new political elite from the manaps. However, these were exceptional cases. Although Russian military authorities acknowledged manaps as the aristocrats of Kyrgyz nomads, they were never incorporated into the official aristocracy (dvorianstvo) of the empire. In 1899, Shabdan had in fact sent a petition to Tsar Nicholas II in an attempt to be elevated, along with his sons, to the rank of "hereditary aristocrat (potomstvennoe dvorianskoe dostoinstvo)", but his request was not granted. 91 It seems reasonable to conclude that manaps, including Shabdan, were integrated to the Russian Empire incompletely. Based on the points outlined above it can therefore be said that while evidence reveals the proximity of manaps and Russian military authorities, a closer look reveals a deep gulf between the two groups. For Russian military authorities, manaps remained "close, yet far." 61 Though the existence of the manaps was convenient for Russian military authorities in maintaining passive stability, the manaps could suddenly and easily change from collaborator to resister due to their incomplete integration into the Russian system of authority. After Shabdan's death, Russian military authorities did not allow his descendants to inherit either his title of Lieutenant Colonel or his specially allotted land 92 and thus prevented them from becoming hereditary elites. Shabdan's heirs' dissatisfaction with this measure reached a breaking point in 1916 and a large-scale revolt broke out in Russian Central Asia that same year. The revolt included the participation of the Kyrgyz nomads of southern Semirech´e, among others. The catalyst for this revolt was a sudden decree ordering compulsory conscription to military service, a move aimed to address the shortage of Russian soldiers fighting in World War I. This revolt helped encourage the collapse of the Russian Empire. 93 As can be seen from the quotation at the beginning of this article, A.N. Kuropatkin, who was appointed as a governor-general of Turkestan in order to settle the disorder, had to witness the shocking 
ABSTRACTS
Despite the imposition of Russian direct rule in 1867, the tribal chieftains bearing the title of " manap" played a dominant role as effective leaders among Kyrgyz nomads throughout the imperial period. This article investigates why manaps were able to maintain this role and how the Russian military authorities dealt with them during the half century of their direct rule. Manaps were useful in supplementing the weakness of Russian rule, and, in fact, the inadequacy of Russian governance was a key factor enabling manaps to maintain their role as the primary ruling class of Kyrgyz nomads until as late as the twentieth century. However, Russian military authorities did not actively recruit manaps as political intermediaries, but were obliged to accommodate to them. In this sense, they were in large part "passively dependent" on manaps, but did not actively protect or nurture them as a political elite.
Les manaps jouèrent un rôle majeur en tant que leaders effectifs des nomades kirghiz tout au long de la période impériale et ce, en dépit de l'imposition de l'administration directe russe en 1867.
Pourquoi ces chefs tribaux furent-ils capables de conserver ce rôle et comment les autorités militaires russes traitèrent-elles avec eux durant le demi-siècle de leur administration directe ? Ce sont les objets de cette étude. L'utilité première des manaps fut de pallier les points faibles de l'administration directe russe. En effet, l'inadéquation de la gouvernance russe fut un élément clé qui permit à la classe des manaps de se maintenir dans son rôle de principale classe dirigeante des nomades kirghiz jusqu'au XX e siècle. Cependant, les autorités militaires russes ne cherchèrent pas à recruter les manaps en qualité d'intermédiaires politiques, elles durent s'en accommoder. En ce sens, on peut dire qu'elles en furent « passivement dépendantes », mais elles ne firent rien pour les protéger ou les entretenir en tant que représentants d'une élite politique. 
